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Abstract—Blockchain is a disruptive technology intended at
implementing secure decentralized distributed systems, in which
transactional data can be shared, stored and verified by partic-
ipants of a system using cryptographic and consensus mecha-
nisms, elevating the need for a central authentication/verification
authority. Contrary to the belief, blockchain-based systems are
not inherently secure by design; it is crucial for security soft-
ware engineers to be aware of the various blockchain specific
architectural design decisions and choices and their consequences
on the dependability of the software system. We argue that
sub-optimal and ill-informed design decisions and choices of
blockchain components and their configurations including smart
contracts, key management, cryptographic and consensus mech-
anisms, on-chain vs. off chain storage choices can introduce
security technical debt into the system. The technical debt
metaphor can serve as a powerful tool for early, preventive and
transparent evaluation of the security design of blockchain-based
systems by making the potential security technical debt visible
to security software engineers. We review the core architectural
components of blockchain-based systems and we show how the
ill-choice or sub-optimal design decisions and configuration of
these components can manifest into security technical debt. We
contribute to a taxonomy that classifies the blockchain specific
design decisions and choices and we describe their connection to
potential debts. The taxonomy can help architects of this category
of systems avoid potential security risks by visualising the security
technical debts and raising its visibility. We use examples from
two case studies to discuss the taxonomy and its application.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Security Technical Debt, Dis-
tributed Systems Design
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain (BC) technology has been receiving wide aca-
demic and industrial recognition ever since the success of
Bitcoin (a digital cryptocurrency), a seminal application based
on BC technology. The use of BC technology has gone beyond
cryptocurrency systems to underlie many mainstream depend-
able software systems including finance, education, healthcare,
transport, homeland security, identity management, etc. Organ-
isation has been leveraging BC and its built-in capabilities, as a
critical component within the software system architecture, to
provide more dependable/secure computation and storage. The
use of BC in an application can be computationally active e.g.
the use of blockchain for active verification – e.g. proof-of-
work or proof-of-stake [1] or computationally passive serving
as immutable storage for critical and sensitive data [2].
Although BC technology has distinct and inherent features
that promise to produce systems that are cryptographically
secure, ill-informed, suboptimal or wrong design decisions
that relate to the choice, usage, configurations of a blockchain
and its components are arguably the root cause of security
technical debt, explicating this category of system. Blockchain
components can, for example, include smart contracts, key
management, cryptographic and consensus mechanisms, on-
chain vs. off chain storage choices.
Contrast to the belief, BC is not inherently secure [3].
Evaluating the security of the design decisions for BC-based
systems is crucial step for realising security requirements. As
an example, verification design decisions within blockchain
can take the form of proof-of-work or proof-of-stake [1].
The verification process can rely on the wisdom and trust
of peers. It can suffer from unnecessary redundancy, wrong
assumptions and suboptimal design decisions of trust and
verification process. Another complication is that these design
decisions need to be weighed against those of performance,
security, cost, energy efficiency among the many quality re-
lated concerns. It is imperative that exhaustive verification can
be expensive to achieve, and designers often take simplified
assumptions and decisions that vary in their level of trust and
rigorous verification. It is also obvious that the architects and
designers need to consider other quality related trade-offs that
can compromise the dependability of the BC-based systems.
Henceforth, we view suboptimal/ill-informed design decisions
incorrect/imperfect assumptions and unmanaged trade-offs for
as forms of security design debts that can subsequently intro-
duce potential security risks into the system. Adversaries can
for example, exploit the limitations in the envisioned design
and verification to compromise the security of the system.
The novel contribution of the paper is a taxonomy that
defines and classifies the major properties and components
of BC-based systems and describes how suboptimal and
ill-design decisions, choices and imperfect assumptions can
manifest into (security) technical debts for this category of
systems.
Software architects and designers for BC-based systems
can leverage the technical debt metaphor to understand and
evaluate the consequences of their design choices and deci-
sions on the security posture and the fundamental objective
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of adopting blockchain to induce a system. The taxonomy
can assist designers and architects to take early interventions,
starting from the inception and design stages through making
the potential security technical debt visible to security software
engineers and software systems adopters. Security Software
Engineers can then better assess the security implications
of the design decisions of building BC- based systems and
various dependability trade-offs. The taxonomy is indeed a
novel attempt to rethink security technical debt in the context
of blockchain by examining the unique characteristics of this
disruptive technology and the way they induce the design
decisions of this category of systems and investigating how
these might incur security TD. Our taxonomy should help
the architect of a BC-based systems to evaluate their design
choices and decisions by investigating the potential presence of
security TD. It can also help in understanding ways the debts
can be accumulated and their ramifications on the security of
the system. Our investigation reveals that BC-based systems
can be more susceptible to security debt by design because
this category of systems can inherently carry security technical
debts that resembles of traditional secure systems, plus an
additional set of blockchain specifications.
Different from previous works on security technical debt [4]
[5], the paper is the first to discuss technical debt in the context
of blockchain architecture. This paper follows a conceptual-to-
empirical approach: it first describes security TD, its causes,
sources, and management; it then presents a taxonomy of
security design decision of BC-based systems and argues how
these decisions may manifest into debt. The taxonomy was
developed following a review of publicly available knowledge
on BC, including academic and industrial literature. We use
scenarios and examples from two cases studies to discuss the
taxonomy and illustrate its use.
II. SECURITY TECHNICAL DEBT
Investigations that relate to security TD are recent. Exam-
ple of studies include [4][5]. In this section, we reflect on
earlier studies and discuss security TD as a prerequisite for
understanding Blockchain security TD. We posit that BC-
based systems TD is essentially a form of security technical
debt. This debt should be studied in the context of design
decisions, which are specific to blockchain, their properties
and configurations.
Security TD can be attributed to innocent design oversights,
sub-optimal or imperfect design decisions which could at some
point lead to security vulnerabilities. Incurring security TD
can compromise security attributes, such as confidentiality,
integrity, non-repudiation, accountability, and authenticity [6].
Any accumulated amount of security TD will have to be repaid
with interest in the future. Interest represents the undesirable
effects of the extra effort/cost that must be exerted to patch up
the system security flaws [7]. Interest of security technical debt
can span many dimensions including costly repairs to stabilize
the security of the system (i.e. security maintenance costs),
cost of rebuilding the trust and retaining what is lost from
users, credibility and reputation damage (i.e, brand damage
costs, follow up costs that relates to preventing misuse of
leaked information).
Ineffective prioritization and mismanagement for security
and associated quality trade-offs are among the major causes
of security TD. When security managers and architects have
to prioritize tasks, they often give security implementation a
lower priority than that of system functionalities. Software
engineers often take security adjustment decisions under tight
resources, time, and budget constraints. For example, man-
agers may ignore employing a more expensive but efficient
countermeasure such as a circuit gateways firewall because
they are uncertain of the likelihoods of future attacks. These
savings and ill-informed decisions can potentially manifest
into security TD. Furthermore, The violation of cybersecurity
compliance rules, best practices, and ignoring security stan-
dards could also manifest into potential security TD. Lack
of expertise or inadequate knowledge regarding the imple-
mentation of secure systems is another reason that security
TD might accumulate [8]. Additionally, design oversights and
wrong assumptions about the domain and/or environment can
manifest into security TD.
One source of security TD in design could relate to the
inappropriate choice of security design patterns. A chosen
pattern, for example, might not be well suited for addressing
the security requirements of the application domain or it may
have been implemented incorrectly, exposing the system into
security risks. Furthermore, the inadequate, deferred, or lack
of testing of security attributes can also be a significant source
of security TD [8].
Security technical debt can be either intentional or un-
intentional [9]. Intentional can be in the advent, where the
likely risks of not deploying the security countermeasures can
be marginal or negligible and the debt and its consequences
can be kept under control. Unintentional security TD can be
accidentally introduced due to the ill-practices described in the
previous section. This kind of TD is worse because it is not
visible. If it remains invisible, the debt can be accumulated and
may manifest into a significant security risk. Both intentional
and unintentional security debts should be carefully managed;
otherwise, a software can become vulnerable to attacks and
the risk of interest accumulation would take various forms of
damage - spanning technical, reputation, juridical, harm etc.
III. SECURITY TECHNICAL DEBT IN
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SYSTEMS
A. Blockchain Background
Blockchain is a chain of ordered blocks, each block is
connected to the previous block via a cryptographic hash
of its content [2]. Generally, each block contains a list of
transactions, a hash of the current block, a hash of the previous
block, a timestamp, and other information such as a nonce
value [10]. Each node participating in the blockchain network
can create a transaction and then exchange it with other peers
in the network. Since the BC technology is based on a peer-
to-peer decentralized network, it does not depend on a central
controller. All authorized nodes in the network need to reach a
consensus, a mechanism to ensure that nodes are in agreement
concerning the latest block to be linked in the chain [11].
B. Blockchain Security Debt
There are several design properties that distinguish a BC-
based system, such as decentralization, immutability, trans-
parency, etc. [10]. As blockchain technology has a complex
infrastructure and multiple configurations, building systems
based on blockchain requires careful evaluation for design
decisions and choices to avoid potential security design debts,
that can lead to potential security risks. Blockchain design
security debt can be attributed to suboptimal or ill-informed
design decisions regarding the design and/or choice of crypto-
graphic algorithms, consensus mechanisms, issues and wrong
assumptions related to the configuration of the chains, smart
contract etc. If incurred, the debt can compromise the security
posture of the system and/or negatively impact the systems
security attributes and trade-offs. Security design decisions for
BC-based systems can leverage our understanding to security
TD analysis to make the potential security TD visible and
manageable.
C. Taxonomy
As Ernst et al. [12] emphasize, the greatest source of
TD is the architectural decisions, due to the fact that these
are difficult to resolve and can take many years to evolve.
To minimize the accumulation and the impact of security
TD incurred due to suboptimal architectural decisions when
building BC-based systems, we propose a blockchain design
taxonomy and discuss its related security TD. This taxonomy
can help an architect to understand a blockchain technology
by classifying its features, dimensions and configurations,
and comparing them according to their security strengths
and weaknesses, thus making the architect aware of potential
security TD when architectural decisions are made. As it can
be difficult to anticipate the attack landscape and the mind-set
of the adversary, this taxonomy helps introduce suggestions to
mitigate the potential security TD in relation to likely threats.
A discussion of architectural design security TD for various
BC-based systems is presented in the following sub-sections.
1) Blockchain Types: Among the crucial design decision
for blockchain based system is the choice of blockchain type.
There are three basic types of blockchain technologies.
Public Blockchain: in this type, also known as a permis-
sionless blockchain, any node can read, send, and verify trans-
actions. Nodes are also able to participate in the consensus
process. A public blockchain is fully decentralized; there is
no central authority that controls the system (for example, by
managing the membership privileges) [10]. This type is highly
available since they have no signal point of failure; they can
better survive in the advent of distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attack. Additionally, public blockchains are more
resilient against ransomware attacks; since the records are
securely stored in every node in the blockchain network, it is
difficult to lock down these redundant records across the whole
network. Another security strength of public blockchains is
their immutability [11]. Once the information is written in the
block, it cannot be altered because it is stored in different
nodes in the decentralized network. Moreover, modifying data
in a single block requires modification of all blocks in the
chain, since they are connected with a cryptographic hash
function. Importantly, the level of integrity of information is
high in public blockchains, as any node can verify that the
data have not been tampered with. Since the records and their
updates are available to the public, the level of transparency
of this type of blockchain is high as well.
However, the decision to consider public blockchain should
be approached with caution. The architect may accelerate the
selection without careful analysis of the security implications
of the said choice, leading to security debt. For instance, in a
public blockchain, the validators can be unknown; as a result,
if the majority of the nodes in the network are malicious, they
can dominate the system and control the consensus process.
This is known as a majority attack or a 51% attack [13].
Consequently, the attacker can perform a double-spending
attack and stop miners, who validate transactions and propose
new blocks, from mining any available blocks. Moreover,
public blockchains can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks [14],
where the attacker creates a large number of pseudonymous
identities which appear to be different nodes, while in reality
they are all under the control of a single party. Therefore, the
attacker can gain influence and control a majority of the nodes
in the network. Importantly, once public blockchain is selected,
the selection should take into consideration likely attacks.
Careful and managed selection shall provide built-in mech-
anism for defending against potential attacks. Henceforth,
architects should evaluate for these extreme scenarios and
trade-offs, when selecting a blockchain type. A misinformed
selection that fails to defend against likely attacks or taking
a shortcut by not implementing adequate defence measures
against likely attacks can carry debt.
Additionally, the decision for adopting this type of
blockchain shall also consider the trade-offs between privacy
and transparency that is required for a given context; a
deviation from this requirement may enter the system into a
debt. While public blockchains are highly transparent and the
chained information is visible to other peers, privacy can be
difficult to be achieved; extra mechanisms might be required
to strike a right balance between the two. Consequences of
taking the security TD may lead to costly repays in the form
of reparation of (financial) loss, if double spending attack
would; for example, take place, or to recover the lost data
and reputation damage, if sensitive data would be leaked.
Private Blockchain: in this type, also knowns as permis-
sioned blockchains, only one organization has writing permis-
sions, while reading permissions can be public or restricted
to a preselected set of readers. Since private blockchains
are controlled by a single group, they are known as fully
centralized blockchains [15]. These specific features of the
private blockchains give them some security advantages. Since
all validators are known- as they are all member of a single
group- some types of attack are difficult to launch, such as the
51% attack and selfish mining attack. Sybil attack is also easy
to prevent, since a centralized authority controls the system
and can verify each node, allowing or rejecting requests to
join the network. Moreover, private blockchains provides a
greater level of privacy, especially when read permission are
also restricted [10]. However, the potential security debt can
be attributed to the wrong trust assumptions when selecting
participants in the network. Moreover, if the number of nodes
in the network is low, private blockchains can be more prone to
certain attacks, such DDoS or ransomware attacks. As public
verifiability is not required, the integrity of the system can
only be ensured if the system is not compromised.
There is another type of permissioned blockchain knowns as
consortium blockchain [11]. This type of BC is partially cen-
tralized, meaning that rather than the system being controlled
by a single organization, a group of pre-selected nodes from
multiple organizations is responsible for consensus and block
validation. Read and write permissions can be determined by
the consortium; they can be public or limited to selected nodes
in the network. Since it is partially decentralized, it provides
better availability than private BCs. It also has better privacy
than public BCs as it is partially private. By knowing the
capabilities, security strengths and weaknesses of each type
of BC technology, architects can choose the type that best
matches the requirements of the BC-based applications they
are attempting to build. The architects may treat potential mis-
matches as a form of debt and use the mismatch information
as a way to evaluate the consequences of taking the debts.
The information can help architects to be aware of security
TD that might be incurred as a result of their design choices.
2) Storage and Computation: Although blockchains have
unique features such as transparency and immutability, there
may also be limitations to their storage space and computa-
tional power. Security, data integrity and users privacy might
be negatively impacted by this limitation and the decisions
to store sensitive information on or off-chain. Henceforth, ar-
chitects can evaluate the off- or on-chain trade-offs decisions.
Mismanagement of this trade-offs can come with a security
technical debt; the interest and cost of this debt can crosscuts
dimensions that relate data integrity, governance, privacy etc.
Data Storage: data can be fully stored on a blockchain.
There are various ways to do this. In the case of Bitcoin,
limited information can be embedded in a transaction. For
instance, by using OP RETURN 1, which is a script that is
used to sign a transaction output as invalid, it is possible to
embed arbitrary data in a transaction. This script can be used
to store up to 80 bytes, and that was changed to be 40 bytes.
The cost of storing 80 bytes of arbitrary data is approximately
$0,036. However, if a large amount of data needed to be
stored on-chain, storing them would become too expensive.
For instance, storing the ownership of a digital artwork on a
blockchain would be very costly due to its size. Additionally,
the confidentiality and privacy of the data stored on a public
blockchain cannot guaranteed, as the content is visible to every
1https://bitcoinfoundation.org/core-development-update-5/
node on the chain. In some BC-based applications, data should
be visible to specific nodes and not to all the nodes in the
network. In these cases, storing data off-chain would help
overcome or mitigate such limitations.
Commonly, when there is a decision to include off-chain
storage, it will be used to store raw data, while meta-data and
hashes of raw data will be stored on-chain [2]. The off-chain
data storage can be a centralized repository such as a private
cloud. However, the shortcut of using a centralized solution,
because it is easy to configure and mange, can come with
a debt in scenarios where centralization decisions can suffer
from a single point of failure, in the advent of attacks e.g.
DDoS. Although the intermediaries cannot alter the data as
their hashes are stored on-chain, it could still fail at some
point to deliver data to certain nodes as the attack propagates
in the network. The potential penalty of this debt can be
high; its future repay may entail costly reconfiguration for
more reliable storage. Another option would be to use peer-
to-peer decentralized file sharing platform such as IPFS 2
(InterPlanetary File System). In such cases, each node would
need to run the blockchain, IPFS, and the middleware that
coordinates between them. The original data is stored in
IPFS, while hashes of this data are stored on-chain. Thus,
the decentralized delivery of off-chain data is achieved.
Transaction Computation: on-chain transactions are pro-
cessed on the blockchain and considered to be valid only
if they are propagated on the public records. Transaction
execution, validation, and consensus mechanism increase the
response time, and require communication and execution over-
heads. Moreover, mining processing- the process of assigning
new blocks to the chain- is expensive because it typically in-
volves a fee. in some BC-based applications, participant nodes
need to prove a property of their confidential data without
propagating it. In this case, it would be feasible to leverage
off-chain computation. Computations can be outsourced to
a third party to hide the information used during execution
and then to generate the result. A proof of correct execution,
such as Zero-knowledge proofs [16] can then be employed,
hence, instead of performing the computation on-chain, the
system merely verifies the proof of correct execution on-chain
[17]. Thus, privacy would be greatly enhanced. Choosing to
place data and computation on-chain or off-chain is a critical
architectural decision that involves several trade-offs that relate
to cost, privacy, security and integrity of information. Such
decisions, if not managed properly can be viewed as debt with
varying consequence, depending on the application domain.
3) Consensus Protocol: while a blockchain is decentralized
technology which does not rely on a centralized authority to
manage, authorize, and verify the transactions, a fault-tolerant
consensus protocol is required to assure that all nodes agree
on the new blocks that are appended to the blockchain. There
are several different consensus mechanisms in use in existing
BC technologies. When and how a transaction is verified and
becomes immutable is depends on the consensus mechanism.
2https://ipfs.io/
Proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism is used in public
blockchain systems such as Bitcoin. In Bitcoin, new blocks are
created using PoW, which is a puzzle that is simple and direct
to verify, but very difficult and takes a long time to be solved.
To generate a new block, the miner must solve a PoW puzzle
using a large amount of computing power. The block will then
be broadcasted to the other nodes in the network to verify it
in consensus [10]. PoW protects the blockchain network form
Sybil attack since the total number of nodes is not important
to solving the PoW puzzle; instead, it is a question of the
total amount of computational power. While it is easy for an
adversary to generate multiple node identities, it is difficult for
them to generate a large amount of computational power.
The decision to implement the PoW mechanism should be
carefully evaluated and managed. The ill-informed decision
can bear security debt since PoW properties can be exploited to
initiate a number of attacks, if the block size is misconfigured.
In PoW, the principle is that no miner should have more than
half of the total processing power; otherwise, such a miner
could effectively control the system by accomplishing attacks
such as the 51% attack, double spending, and the selfish
mining attack. In selfish mining, malicious miners collude
to increase their benefits by enforcing the honest miners to
waste their power on creating blocks that eventually will not
be linked to the chain. Meanwhile, the selfish miners can keep
their mined blocks private, trying to maintain a private branch
that is longer than the public branch. The selfish miners, can
then reveal their branch and the honest miners switch to it;
thus, the selfish miners win and take the reward, while the
honest miners lose and waste their power [13]. The choice
of the block size configuration and the number of block
confirmations in a configuration can have potential impact on
resisting/confining attacks. Hence, such decisions can bear a
debt if they are not properly evaluated against these scenarios
or they lag behind what is optimal for a given context/situation.
Alternative consensuses mechanisms can be used such as
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) to mitigate the potential security debts.
In this mechanism, which is also used in public blockchain, a
miner must prove their ownership of the cryptocurrency and
pay a certain amount of it in order to mine blocks. This cryp-
tocurrency will either be returned to the miner as a bonus, if
the block is validated, or it will be fined [13]. Interestingly, PoS
increases protection against malicious attacks: executing the
attacks would be very expensive, as the attacker would need to
own large amounts of money to perform the attack. Moreover,
a miner who possesses a large stake most likely would not
attack the system - for example, via double spending- since
the attacker would eventually suffer from this attack because
it would decrease the value of the cryptocurrency. To protect
this mechanism, from possible attacks, the additional factor
with combination of stake size should be considered.
There are other consensus mechanisms that suitable for
permissioned blockchains such as Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT) [10]. In this mechanism, the identity of each
miner must be known. Noticeably, each consensus mechanism
has unique security properties which need to considered when
architectural design decisions are made. Otherwise, if an
unsuitable mechanism is selected, or the necessarily counter-
measures are not considered, the ill-practice can carry security
TD, and serious attacks can exploit weaknesses in the design.
4) Protocol Configuration:
Block Size: refers to the maximum number of transac-
tions aggregated within a block. The system’s throughput is
sensitive to the block size. Public blockchains currently can
only process 3-20 transactions per second, which is very low
compared to other payment services such as Visa, which can
accomplish 2000 transactions per second. Consequently, some
public blockchains, like Bitcoin, have raised their throughput
by increasing the block size from 1MB to 8MB [18]. However,
deciding to increase the size should be carefully considered
and needs to be evaluated in relation to their consequences
on security, data governance and performance and relative to
requirements of the application domain. Decisions that are not
optimal for the said trade-offs can come with debts. Large
blocks size can cause slower propagation speeds, which in
turn result in raising the number of stale blocks [19]; these
are blocks that are not joined to the longest chain, because of
a conflict or concurrency. Stale blocks do weaken the security
of the blockchain because they cause chain forks that decrease
the growth of the main chain. This can consequently increase
the chances of an attacker in the network performing possible
attacks such as double spending. Obviously, there is a trade-
off between security and throughput in the BC-based systems;
henceforth, the architect needs to be aware of this trade-offs
and discuss the potential related debts, if such trade-offs is not
properly managed, when deciding the block size configuration.
Number of Block Confirmations: commonly, in the BC-
based systems, a transaction is confirmed after waiting for
a specific number of blocks to have been created once the
transaction has joined the blockchain. This strategy has been
used to guarantee that a transaction is attached to the longest
chain securely in order to prevent double spending. Another
strategy for transaction confirmation is to add a checkpoint
to the blockchain [2]. The transaction is accepted once the
checkpoint is valid; otherwise, if the fork chain starts before
the checkpoint appears, it will be rejected by all nodes. An
architect should choose the confirmation strategy that is most
suitable and has the promise to provide the optimal security to
the BC-based applications. Deciding on the required number
of blocks for confirmation is a critical design decision, a
wrong decision aimed at accelerating the confirmations can
bear debts.
5) Cryptographic Components: cryptography is a key com-
ponent of blockchain, which delivers system security proper-
ties such as integrity and non-repudiation. Two main crypto-
graphic primitives that play an important role in blockchain
are the cryptographic hash function and digital signature. The
decision of selecting the cryptographic algorithms for each
aforementioned primitive should be approached with caution
since not considering the potential vulnerabilities of each of
them, the decision can bear security debt.
Cryptographic Hash Function: in BC-based systems, the
hash function is used for many operations. One property
of the hash function is that it is hard to invert; however,
it is easy to verify. Therefore, any miner can easily verify
the correctness of the block. Another property is that the
smallest change to the input will result in an entirely different
output. As data in each block is hashed, any modification or
tampering with the data can be detected by all of the nodes
in the network. Additionally, calculating a hash of the block
requires a hash value of the previous block, which makes the
blockchain tamper-resilience linked list. Collision resilience
is an important property of the hash function, meaning it is
computationally infeasible to obtain the same hash output from
two different inputs. However, the hash function is vulnerable
to collision attacks. Unawareness of such vulnerabilities when
selected hash function and their implication on the security
properties of the system, such as integrity and immutability,
can enter the system into security design debts. Once a first
single collision has been found, multiple collisions can be
generalized and eventually it becomes feasible to compute
them. Furthermore, quantum computing will make some at-
tacks much easier [20].
Digital Signature: uses asymmetric-key cryptography, in
which each node should have a paired of private key and public
key. The private key should be kept secret since it is used to
sign the transaction, while the corresponding public key can
be used by any node in the system to confirm the ownership
of the signed transaction and to verify that the transaction
has not been modified or tampered with. The public key is
mathematically derived from the private key. Although there
is a connection between the two keys, the private key cannot
be identified using knowledge of the public key. The key
generation algorithm of a digital signature scheme should have
a good randomness source to generate different key pairs for
different users. Otherwise, a weak randomness source could
allow an attacker to recover a users private key and sign
transactions. Mayer [21] found a vulnerability in the elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), which is used in
the Bitcoin system. This algorithm does not generate enough
randomness during the signature process, which allows the at-
tacker to discover the users private key. Henceforth, the choice
of a wrong digital signature algorithm for a given application
can come with debts if the level of required randomness for
a given domain is not met. Symmetric-key cryptography can
also be used in blockchains if the data needs to be encrypted to
preserve confidentiality. Oversights of implementing it when
it is required would increase the potential security debts and
observed the violation of confidentiality.
It is important to anticipate the impact of broken primitives,
so that effective and appropriate countermeasures can be put in
place to reduce the potential security debt. In [20], the authors
demonstrate a threat model for broken primitive on Bitcoin,
such as the SHA256 hash function and ECDSA. In addition,
they suggest a migration strategy in case a cryptographic
primitive is broken.
6) Key Management: there are several alternative ways to
manage and store private keys, each of which has its own
security properties. Investigating them carefully and analysing
their possible security threats is crucial, mismanagement deci-
sions can bear security debt. In BC-based systems, users can
use a piece of software, called a wallet, to store their private
keys securely. Public keys and associated addresses, which are
derived from public keys by using a hash function, can also
be stored in the wallet. Keys can be stored in the device wallet
directly on the specific file on the disk; thus, the user can have
full control over his keys. However, private keys might still be
under threat, as there are several attacks related to blockchains
that have been crafted to steal secret keys, and not necessarily
target the blockchain itself. For instance, specifically crafted
malware, or man-in-the-browser attacks [14] that involves the
use of malware. If the device is compromised, the attacker
can steal all the keys. To mitigate the potential security debts
as a result of the decision of employing a single key, multi-
signature can be used. This means that multiple secret keys
are needed to generate the signatures. M signatures out of N
private keys are required to sign any transaction. A simple
example is that two-factor wallet that requires two devices-
such as users mobile phone and laptop- to sign any transaction.
However, this scheme increases the transactions size and
negatively affects the confidentiality of the transaction, since
it will be visible in the public block that a multi-signature
transaction has been used.
Alternative signature schemes such as threshold signatures
[22] can be used to minimize debts. In this scheme, a
transaction can be signed using shares of a single private
key. These shares are split among N parties using threshold
cryptography. This scheme provides the same M-of-N security
but increases the confidentiality since transactions look like
normal transactions on the blockchain and the parameters M
and N are kept private. Architects should provide a good
enough security scheme to safeguard the private keys; oth-
erwise, increasing rework cost of the unpaid TD would be
accrued especially if the potential attacks are taken place, such
as the attack that breached Bitfinex’s cryptocurrency exchange
[3]. 120.000 bitcoins disappeared from users accounts because
of this attack. Therefore, extra effort should be approached to
resituate the loss and rebuild the users trust.
7) Smart Contract: a smart contract is a piece of code
and instructions that determines how and when data should
move, without the need for a central authority to approve
the instructions. The smart contract shows the blockchains
participants whether or not specific conditions were met.
If the conditions are not met, the smart contract has the
capability to lock an asset [1]. Each deployed smart contract
should have a unique address to allow a user to interact
with it through transactions. Smart contracts can be used
in permissionless blockchains such as Ethereum 3 , which
established its own blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete
language to program its smart contracts. To execute the code
of a smart contract, users should pay out a certain amount of
cryptocurrency based on the underlying BC platform, such as
3https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash
the ETH cryptocurrency used in Ethereum. The execution time
should be limited based on the code complexity. Once the limit
has been exceeded, execution should stop. This mechanism
prevents malicious code from being applied to smart contracts,
such as consuming all resources by coding an infinite loop
to apply DDoS attack. Smart contracts can also be used in
permissioned blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric 4, when
the data of the contract need to be kept private and only a
limited number of known nodes need to know about it.
Even though the smart contract is an important component
in the second generation of blockchain technology, due to
its powerful capabilities, it may still have several security
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is crucial to perform attack anal-
yses for smart contract. The architect may use attack trees
to visualise the likely attacks, their consequences and to
design mitigation strategies. Twelve forms of vulnerability
were systematically studied by Atzei et al. [23]. Moreover,
8833 Ethereum smart contracts were shown to be vulnerable,
as Luu et al. [24] discovered. They discovered several security
bugs, which were the main cause of the security vulnera-
bilities. These bugs included timestamp dependence: since
some smart contracts conditions based on a timestamp being
triggered, if an adversary could alter it, the smart contract
would become vulnerable. The lack of analysis may ship the
system with vulnerabilities in the design, not providing good
enough defence mechanisms against common attacks. This
practice is an attribution to debts.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In the following section, we show how the taxonomy can
help architects and designers to identify potential security
debts in BC-based systems and mitigate the consequences of
that debt. We use examples from two case studies to show how
the taxonomy can be mapped to discuss core design decisions
and choices related to BC components and configurations and
their attribution to security debt.
A. uPort Architectural Design and Analysis
uPort 5is an open-source BC-based system for self-sovereign
identity. It aims to return ownership of digital identities to
individuals and eliminate the need for the centralized in-
termediaries [25]. The public permissionless Ethereum BC
is the underlying platform that was used to build uPort.
Therefore, the system is available to anyone to create and store
identities, which means all participants are unknown. Since
the information is publicly available, all nodes can validate the
state of the chain and any identity can be verified. As uPort was
built on top of Ethereum, a PoW consensus mechanism was
used, which provides security against Sybil attack, however, if
one node or group of malicious nodes have more than 50% of
the hashing power, they can control the entire system, as PoW
is prone to 51% attack unless an appropriate countermeasure
is already in place as discussed in section III.C.3.
4https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
5https://www.uport.me/
The data associated with the identity are stored off-chain
on IPFS and the data can be retrieved by their hashes. In
Ethereum, the Keccak 6 hash function is used, and to sign any
transaction, the ECDSA scheme is used which, has certain
vulnerability as mentioned previously. Any transaction occur-
ring in Ethereum requires a payment of ETH cryptocurrency.
Three smart contracts were designed in uPort: Controller,
Proxy, and Registry. To generate a new user identity, the uPort
mobile application generates the public and private key pair,
then sends the transaction to the BC which initiates a new
Controller to store a reference to the public key. After that,
a new Proxy is generated which stores a reference to the
Controller contract that was just generated. The Proxy address
includes the unique uPort identifier (uPort-ID), whereby a user
can create multiple of them. The user’s private key is stored
only on her mobile device. A key recovery protocol is in place
in order to recover a users key in cases in which it has been
lost or stolen. In such cases, the Controller should retain a
list of recovery trustees, such as the user’s friends, who can
help the user to recover her keys. If a quorum is completed,
the Controller can remove the lost public key and store a new
one by invoking a dedicated function on the Proxy. Thus, a
persistent uPort-ID can be preserved even after the loss of
cryptographic keys.
However, in the uPort architecture, all the user’s recovery
trustees are publicly available in the Ethereum. This trans-
parency allows the attacker to target a users trustees to obtain
their identities. If an adversary can compromise a mobile
application and change a users trustees through the Controller,
the uPort-ID will be compromised permanently. The third
smart contract is a Register which stores the hash of the
identity attributes and maps them to users uPort-IDs. This map
might leak information about attributes and their relationships
to the identity provider.
B. Electronic Medical Record Sharing Architectural Design
and Analysis
The second case study is a framework that manages and
shares electronic medical record (EMR) data for cancer pa-
tient care. This framework was proposed by Dubovitskaya
et al. [26] in collaboration with a Stony Brook University
Hospital. They utilize BC technology to maintain immutable
and verifiable records that keep track of all actions arising
across the network. This helps to improve the integrity of
distributed sensitive medical data, reducing the time needed to
share EMRs and the overall cost. This medical application was
built on top of the Hyperledger permissioned BC, in order to
safeguard the privacy of the highly sensitive data. Additionally,
a fast response time is highly necessary in the medical system,
which can be provided easily by a permission BC. Also, in
permissioned BCs, there is no need to pay for a transaction’s
execution and this helps increase the usability of that system.
Since all users in a medical application are known (patients,
doctors) and only a predefined set of nodes are allowed
6https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash
TABLE I
EVALUATION OF UPORT DESIGN DECISIONS AND CHOICES
BC Design Architecture Design Decisions and Choices Decisions Evaluation Consequences Examples of Debt
Using a Taxonomy Mitigation
BC Type Public permissionless, Ethereum Potential security TD is taken because of Information disclosure. Implementing symmetric
the mismanagemen of the trade-off Privacy and confidentiality encryption.
between privacy and transparency by not breach.
applying the secure mechanism to
preserve data privacy. See section III.C.1
Data Storage On-chain: Controller, Proxy, Security TD is mitigated because of Increased system -
and Registry smart contracts. taking the right decision of employing dependability.
Off-chain: IPFS the distributed off-chain storage.
See section III.C.2
Consensus Protocol PoW Potential security TD might be taken 51% attacks. Changing the consensus
because of the misinformed decision Breach of data integrity. protocol.
of the selected consensus mechanism.
See section III.C.3
Hash Function SAH-3 Potential security TD is taken because of Collison attacks. Implementing alternative
the misinformed decision of selecting Breach of data integrity, secure hash function.
vulnerable choice. immutability, and
See section III.C.5 non-repudiation.
Digital Signature ECDSA Potential security TD is taken because of Recover sk. Implementing secure
the misinformed decision of selecting Breach system authenticity digital signature.
vulnerable choice. See section III.C.5 and integrity.
Symmetric Cryptography Not used Potential security TD is taken because of Information disclosure. Implementing secure
the accelerated decision of not applying Privacy and confidentiality symmetric encryption.
the secure mechanism to preserve data breach.
confidentiality. See section III.C.1 and III.C.5
Key Management pk, sk Potential security TD is taken sk can be stolen. Using multiple keys
because of lag behind the optimal Breach system authenticity or key shares.
choice. Section III.C.6 and integrity.
TABLE II
EVALUATION OF EMR SYSTEM DESIGN DECISIONS AND CHOICES
BC Design Architecture Design Decisions and Choices Decisions Evaluation Consequences Examples of Debt
Using a Taxonomy Mitigation
BC Type Consortium permissioned, Potential security TD might be taken because Single point of failure. Conducting a security
Hyperledger of the suboptimal decision of selecting DDoS attack. analysis to decide
a limited number of participants. Ransomware attack. the right number of
See section III.C.1 Decrease system and/or participants on the
data availability. system.
Data Storage On-chain: Logic and State Potential security TD is taken because of Single point of failure. Using distributed storage.
Chainecode the suboptimal decision of employing DDoS attack.
Off-chain: local database, the centralized off-chain solutions. Ransomware attack.
Cloud. See section III.C.2 Decrease system and/or
data availability.
Consensus Protocol PBFT Security TD is mitigated because of the Prevent Sybil attacks. -
chosen trusted validator (identity of miners Increase systems integrity
is known). See section III.C.2 and authenticity.
Hash Function AdHash/ MD5 Potential security TD is taken because of Collison attacks. Implementing alternative
the misinformed decision of selecting Breach of data integrity, secure hash function.
vulnerable choice (MD5). immutability, and
See section III.C.5 non-repudiation.
Digital Signature Unknown Taking a well-informed decision for choosing - -
the secure digital signature is crucial to avoid
security TD. See section III.C.5
Symmetric Cryptography Used but the algorithm Encrypting the stored data mitigates the Increase data confidentiality -
type is not specified security TD. See section III.C.5 and user privacy.
Key Management Signature: pkSU , sk
S
U Potential security TD is taken because of Secret keys could be stolen. Using multiple keys
Asymmetric Encryption: pkεU , sk
ε
U lag behind the optimal choice. Breach system authenticity or key shares.
Symmetric Encryption: SKAεS Section III.C.6 and integrity.
to participate in the PBEF consensus mechanism, security
attacks such as 51% and Sybil attacks are unlikely to occur as
previously discussed. In the Hyperledger BC, smart contracts
were developed in the form of Chaincode, which comprises
of Logic and correlated State components. Logic is a set
of instructions that allow the patient to specify fine-grained
access control policy for his own data and permit efficient
data sharing. The State of the Chaincode saves the information
as key-value format, where the key is a patient ID in the
system and the value is a patients record, and it also includes
corresponding block number. When creating a new user, the
Membership Service component of the medical application is
responsible for registering the user according to his role.
A registered doctor can upload, access, and share data based
on the permissions defined by the patient. The Logic of the
Chaincode does the verification of the access control rights.
Each doctor has a public key pkSU and a private key sk
S
U for
signing, as well as a pkεU and sk
ε
U for encryption. Patient can
generate a metadata record on the Chaincode, retrieve it, and
specify permissions. In addition to the two aforementioned key
pairs, patient also has a symmetric encryption key SKAεS
that encrypts and decrypts patient data. If a patient needs
to enable a doctor to access his data, he should encrypt the
SKAεS with the encryption public key of the doctor pkεD,
and then share the encrypted value with the doctor. Since
each user has a single key pair for signing and another single
key pair for encryption, these keys constitute a single point
of failure. If an attacker success to compromise them, he
could sign and encrypt data himself. Moreover, if a passive
attacker compromises the symmetric key of the patient, he
could decrypt and observe data.
Patient metadata is stored on-chain, while two off-chain
storage locations are used to store the patients raw data: an
in- hospital database that stores the oncology-related data, and
a cloud storage database that saves a patients data that and
is organized according to specific categories of the data and
encrypted with the patients symmetric key. A doctor can access
data in the cloud storage according to the permission policy
specified by the patient and implemented in the Chaincode
Logic. These two off-chain storages reintroduce centralization
into the BC-based system and can function as a single point
of failure and prone to attacks such as DDoS attack.
Table I and Table II demonstrate the evaluation of the
design choices and decisions of the two case studies by
using a taxonomy that has been presented in section III.C.
Consequences of the security debts and examples on how to
mitigate them are also illustrated in the tables. It is worth
noting that other debt mitigation strategies can be possible,
we only look at sample examples.
V. DISCUSSION
The consequence of the debt can crosscut several dimen-
sions such as confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and
authenticity. The consequence can be discussed in relation to
the core objective of the applications and the enhanced security
by inducing the system with blockchain. For the simplicity, the
three main security requirements, known as CIA, an acronym
corresponding to confidentiality, integrity and availability, that
any security design should address are considered.
Confidentiality: effective security defences should be con-
sidered to prevent unauthorized users from reading sensitive
data. Suboptimal decision due to the application of weak (not
secure enough) security mechanism (e.g. symmetric encryp-
tion) can carry a security debt, where the debt symptoms can
be observed on breaches to confidentiality. Since uPort was
built on the public blockchain, any participating node with the
chain can access the data stored in the Registry smart contract,
where the overall data structure is visible. As discussed in
section III.C.1 this design should be evaluated taking into
account that node are not necessarily trusted. Henceforth,
the design should provide built-in mechanism to safe guard
the system against mistrusted nodes. The evaluator should
also consider managing the trade offs between transparency
and privacy as discussed in Section III.C.1. Inappropriate
management for this trade-off can disclose the relationship
between an identity provider and their metadata signaling a
potential risk. In contrast, the EMR system was built on a
permissioned blockchain, which preserves the confidentiality
of the patients data by encrypting it before storing it and
allowing the patient to define fine-grained access control over
his data. However, if a doctors skεD is stolen, an attacker
can decrypt the patients data, because the patient encrypts his
symmetric key SKAεS by the doctor pkεU . Consequently, if
the choice of the key is not analysed for potential risk, or by
deploying the wrong key that does not guarantee security, the
choice would bear a debt. This trial and error decision of using
single key pair over the alternative available solutions such as
multiple keys or key shares can exhibit high security debt in
the design. Once the attack is accomplished, extra effort is
required to provide a mechanism that recover the system from
the loss of the confidential data and protect the users of whom
their data may have been leaked.
Integrity: taking suboptimal design decision of applying in-
effective safeguarding mechanisms against potential data ma-
nipulation due to the time or budget limitations can introduce
security debts into the systems. Analysing the effectiveness of
the chosen mechanism is necessary to avoid security technical
debt. If the mechanism has proven to be ineffective from the
security point of view, alternative choices should be considered
to provide better integrity and minimising the security debt
and potential consequences. In uPort any tampering with data
in a block is visible to the whole nodes that participate in
this public BC network. Also, any participant can verify the
integrity of a distributed identity and the ownership of the
signed transactions. These properties are achieved by using a
consensus mechanism, hash function, and digital signature. As
Ethereum is the underlying BC of uPort, the vulnerable ECDA
scheme is used whereby an attack is be able to recover users
private keys. The choice of this digital signature algorithm is a
visible security technical debt as this signature is proven to be
weak - see section III.C.5. Furthermore, the single private key
is stored in the mobile application which can be compromised
by attackers, allowing them to steal the private key and sign
any transaction, as discussed section IV.A. Taking ill-informed
or suboptimal decision of applying single key because it is
easy to implement and manage would be a potential security
debt on the system. Considering multi-signature is example of
alternative solution that can mitigate the debts.
Similarly, in the EMR system, a single key pair is used to
sign a transaction, which makes it easier for the attacker to
target a single location. For instance, if a doctors private key
is stolen, the attacker could upload files and sign transactions
as the doctor. Therefore, if the architect had not applied an
adequate threat model to assess the security risk level of
applying single key on the system and ill-informed or sub-
optimal design decision had been taken, high security debt
is carried. In case of an attack, an extra effort/cost becomes
unavoidable to recover the system, retrieve original data, and
protect the users of whom their data has been manipulated.
Availability: taking well-informed decisions and applying
mechanisms that ensure secure data and service availability is
crucial for avoiding security technical debt. uPorts availability
is high because a fully decentralized and distributed public
blockchain is used. Additionally, it uses distributed file sharing
IPFS to store data off-chain. On the other hand, a local
database and cloud storage are used to store data off-chain
in the EMR system. This style of storage can suffer from
a single point of failure, negatively affecting the availability
of the data and the service. For example, it is easier for the
attacker to apply a DDoS attack for a single storage place
to make the system unavailable. Therefore, if the availability
impact of choosing this style of storage had not been carefully
assessed, the system would incur security debt and an extra
maintenance cost for recovering the system and remaintating
availability level should be paid back. This is an addition to
rebuild/retaining customer’s trust.
As it can be difficult to eliminate the security debt, visualiz-
ing the potential security technical debt of BC-based systems
at early design stage is important. The above are just examples
on how the taxonomy can be mapped to evaluate the key
design decisions of BC-based system for debts and mitigate
their ramifications through alternative design.
VI. RELATED WORK
Blockchain technology has been the focus of several re-
searches. Two research studies [2][27] represent a classifi-
cation of the architectural properties of BC-based systems
and show the impact of these properties on the performance
and quality attributes of the system. Yet, their impact on
the security properties and their consequential security risks
has not been covered. In [13], the authors reviewed the
security threats to blockchain and the corresponding attacks,
and suggested some security solutions for blockchain. Also,
Lin et al. [11] have presented a general overview of blockchain
and briefly explained some security attacks. However, none
of these works address the problem of suboptimal design
decisions of BC-based systems and their impact on different
security requirements. This study has applied the TD metaphor
to raise the visibility of possible security risks caused by the
non-ideal design options of BC-based systems. Despite the
vast contributions on technical debt in software, only a couple
of studies has looked at security TD. In [4], the authors applied
technical debt knowledge to identify software vulnerabilities.
Analysing technical debt correlated with security weaknesses
had been investigated by [5]. Different from previous works
on security technical debt, to our knowledge, we are the first
to investigate security TD in BC-based systems architectures.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have argued that systems that leverage BC are not
inherently secure by design. We have posited that the technical
debt metaphor can serve as a powerful tool for evaluating
the security design decisions and choices of blockchain-
based systems. We have discussed how design decisions and
choices of blockchain components and their configurations,
covering smart contracts, key management, cryptographic and
consensus mechanisms, on-chain vs. off chain storage choices
can manifest into security technical debt. We have contributed
to a taxonomy that classifies the blockchain specific design
decisions and choices and their attribution to potential debts in
the design. The taxonomy can help architects of this category
of systems to avoid potential security risks by visualising the
security technical debts and raising its visibility to ease TD
management. We have used examples from two case studies
to show how the taxonomy can be mapped to discuss core
design decisions and choices related to BC type, data stor-
age, consensus protocol, hash function, digital signature, key
management and cryptographic choices and their attribution to
security debt. We highlight the consequences of the debt and
given examples on how to mitigate the debts.
REFERENCES
[1] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H.-N. Dai, and H. Wang, “Blockchain challenges and
opportunities: A survey,” Work Pap.–2016, 2016.
[2] X. Xu, I. Weber, M. Staples, L. Zhu, J. Bosch, L. Bass, C. Pautasso, and
P. Rimba, “A taxonomy of blockchain-based systems for architecture de-
sign,” in Software Architecture (ICSA), 2017 IEEE International Conference
on, pp. 243–252, IEEE, 2017.
[3] K. International, “Securing the chain,” tech. rep., 2017.
[4] R. L. Nord, I. Ozkaya, E. J. Schwartz, F. Shull, and R. Kazman, “Can
knowledge of technical debt help identify software vulnerabilities?,” in
CSET@ USENIX Security Symposium, 2016.
[5] C. Izurieta, K. Kimball, D. Rice, and T. Valentien, “A position study to
investigate technical debt associated with security weaknesses,” in 2018
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Technical Debt, pp. 138–142, IEEE,
2018.
[6] O. internationale de normalisation, Systems and Software Engineering: Sys-
tems and Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE): System
and Software Quality Models. ISO/IEC, 2011.
[7] T. Besker, A. Martini, and J. Bosch, “Managing architectural technical debt:
A unified model and systematic literature review,” Journal of Systems and
Software, vol. 135, pp. 1–16, 2018.
[8] E. Tom, A. Aurum, and R. Vidgen, “An exploration of technical debt,”
Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 86, no. 6, pp. 1498–1516, 2013.
[9] T. Klinger, P. Tarr, P. Wagstrom, and C. Williams, “An enterprise perspective
on technical debt,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on managing
technical debt, pp. 35–38, ACM, 2011.
[10] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H. Dai, X. Chen, and H. Wang, “An overview of blockchain
technology: Architecture, consensus, and future trends,” in Big Data (Big-
Data Congress), 2017 IEEE International Congress on, pp. 557–564, IEEE,
2017.
[11] I.-C. Lin and T.-C. Liao, “A survey of blockchain security issues and
challenges.,” IJ Network Security, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 653–659, 2017.
[12] N. A. Ernst, S. Bellomo, I. Ozkaya, R. L. Nord, and I. Gorton, “Measure
it? manage it? ignore it? software practitioners and technical debt,” in
Proceedings of the 2015 10th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software
Engineering, pp. 50–60, ACM, 2015.
[13] X. Li, P. Jiang, T. Chen, X. Luo, and Q. Wen, “A survey on the security of
blockchain systems,” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2017.
[14] E. English, A. Kim, and M. Nonaka, “advancing blockchain cybersecurity:
Technical and policy considerations for the financial services industry ,”
Cybersecurity policy and resilience, p. 81, 2018.
[15] K. Wu¨st and A. Gervais, “Do you need a blockchain?,” in 2018 Crypto Valley
Conference on Blockchain Technology (CVCBT), pp. 45–54, IEEE, 2018.
[16] A. Kosba, A. Miller, E. Shi, Z. Wen, and C. Papamanthou, “Hawk: The
blockchain model of cryptography and privacy-preserving smart contracts,”
in IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP), pp. 839–858, IEEE, 2016.
[17] J. Eberhardt and S. Tai, “On or off the blockchain? insights on off-chaining
computation and data,” in European Conference on Service-Oriented and
Cloud Computing, pp. 3–15, Springer, 2017.
[18] C. Decker and R. Wattenhofer, “Information propagation in the bitcoin
network,” in Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2013 IEEE Thirteenth Inter-
national Conference on, pp. 1–10, IEEE, 2013.
[19] A. Gervais, G. O. Karame, K. Wu¨st, V. Glykantzis, H. Ritzdorf, and
S. Capkun, “On the security and performance of proof of work blockchains,”
in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pp. 3–16, ACM, 2016.
[20] I. Giechaskiel, C. Cremers, and K. B. Rasmussen, “On bitcoin security in
the presence of broken crypto primitives.,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
vol. 2016, p. 167, 2016.
[21] H. Mayer, “Ecdsa security in bitcoin and ethereum: a research survey,”
CoinFaabrik, June, vol. 28, 2016.
[22] R. Gennaro, S. Goldfeder, and A. Narayanan, “Threshold-optimal dsa/ecdsa
signatures and an application to bitcoin wallet security,” in International
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, pp. 156–174,
Springer, 2016.
[23] N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli, “A survey of attacks on ethereum
smart contracts,” in Principles of Security and Trust, pp. 164–186, Springer,
2017.
[24] L. Luu, D.-H. Chu, H. Olickel, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Making smart
contracts smarter,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pp. 254–269, ACM, 2016.
[25] C. Lundkvist, R. Heck, J. Torstensson, Z. Mitton, and M. Sena, “Uport:
A platform for self-sovereign identity,” URL: https://whitepaper. uport.
me/uPort whitepaper DRAFT20170221. pdf, 2017.
[26] A. Dubovitskaya, Z. Xu, S. Ryu, M. Schumacher, and F. Wang, “Secure
and trustable electronic medical records sharing using blockchain,” in AMIA
Annual Symposium Proceedings, vol. 2017, p. 650, American Medical
Informatics Association, 2017.
[27] X. Xu, C. Pautasso, L. Zhu, V. Gramoli, A. Ponomarev, A. B. Tran, and
S. Chen, “The blockchain as a software connector,” in 2016 13th Working
IEEE/IFIP Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA), pp. 182–191,
IEEE, 2016.
